Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present
Author: Michael E. Latham
Pubpsher: Cornell University Press
After World War II, a powerful conviction took hold among American intellectuals and policymakers: that the United States could profoundly accelerate and ultimately direct the development of the decolonizing world, serving as a modernizing force around the globe. By accelerating economic growth, promoting agricultural expansion, and encouraging the rise of enlightened elites, they hoped to link development with security, preventing revolutions and rapidly creating liberal, capitalist states. In The Right Kind of Revolution, Michael E. Latham explores the role of modernization and development in U.S. foreign policy from the early Cold War through the present. The modernization project rarely went as its architects anticipated. Nationalist leaders in postcolonial states such as India, Ghana, and Egypt pursued their own independent visions of development. Attempts to promote technological solutions to development problems also created unintended consequences by increasing inequality, damaging the environment, and supporting coercive social policies. In countries such as Guatemala, South Vietnam, and Iran, U.S. officials and policymakers turned to modernization as a means of counterinsurgency and control, ultimately shoring up dictatorial regimes and exacerbating the very revolutionary dangers they wished to resolve. Those failures contributed to a growing challenge to modernization theory in the late 1960s and 1970s. Since the end of the Cold War the faith in modernization as a panacea has reemerged. The idea of a global New Deal, however, has been replaced by a neoliberal emphasis on the power of markets to shape developing nations in benevolent ways. U.S. policymakers have continued to insist that history has a clear, universal direction, but events in Iraq and Afghanistan give the lie to modernization's false hopes and appealing promises.
Release on 2002-11-01 | by Professor Harold Perkin,Harold Perkin
Professional Elites in the Modern World
Author: Professor Harold Perkin,Harold Perkin
This volume examines the leading professional societies since World War II - those in the free market economies of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Japan, and those in the collapsed command economies of East Germany and the Soviet Union. It praises their achievements, but also warns of the greed and corruption of their elites, aking whether corruption rather than ideology caused the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and if Anglo-American capitalism is likely to go the same way.
International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order
Author: Eric Helleiner
Pubpsher: Cornell University Press
Eric Helleiner's new book provides a powerful corrective to conventional accounts of the negotiations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. These negotiations resulted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—the key international financial institutions of the postwar global economic order. Critics of Bretton Woods have argued that its architects devoted little attention to international development issues or the concerns of poorer countries. On the basis of extensive historical research and access to new archival sources, Helleiner challenges these assumptions, providing a major reinterpretation that will interest all those concerned with the politics and history of the global economy, North-South relations, and international development. The Bretton Woods architects—who included many officials and analysts from poorer regions of the world—discussed innovative proposals that anticipated more contemporary debates about how to reconcile the existing liberal global economic order with the development aspirations of emerging powers such as India, China, and Brazil. Alongside the much-studied Anglo-American relationship was an overlooked but pioneering North-South dialogue. Helleiner’s unconventional history brings to light not only these forgotten foundations of the Bretton Woods system but also their subsequent neglect after World War II.
The history of the United States in the last thirty years, its preoccupation with the Vietnam War and the devastating affects of that war on the psyche of this nation is evidence of a foreign policy tragedy. Foreign policy tragedy brings domestic tragedy in its wake. The purpose of this study is to work out why the approaches to social revolution--and that is what the Vietnam War was about--have been wrong on both sides of the ideological spectrum the last thirty years in the U.S., point out why they were wrong, point to where they were wrong, and point to the consequences of acting in a society when the perceptions are in certain respects wrong. Let me sum up my perception on what went wrong in Vietnam. It was a Right wing war fought on Left wing premises. It was a war that could not have been won because those who designed it would not or could not win it--but were also afraid of losing it. It was a war that was wrongly perceived by both sides of the ideological spectrum. The Liberal argument was that America tried everything and still lost it! The Conservative argument was that it could have been won if the opposition had not tied their hands, keeping them from an all out effort that would have been required to win it. The war was started in earnest by the Liberals under Kennedy. The strategy was to roll up the enemy by hitting on the peasant and through it, cut off the leaders. Pacification, education, re-education, indoctrination, and the introduction of self-defense techniques to the South Vietnamese peasants was meant to stop the revolution exported from the North in its tracks. The U.S. policy was predicated on the assumption that the peasants really had something to do with the ruling functions of the North Vietnamese revolution after Thermidor; that after the onset of Thermidor--after the institutionalization of the revolution--in Hanoi, the revolution was still revolution. The Liberal approach has believed that revolution is tantamount to Maos view of it in China--peasants all immersed in the revolutionary process as fish in the sea. And so you would have to drain the very ocean itself to stop it. Our approach to the post revolutionary process is that after the onset of Thermidor in a society, revolution is a bunch of terror informed super bureaucrats at the center of a society increasingly cut off from the periphery. In a post revolutionary society, it is the leaders that matter--not the fish in the sea. So bombing the small fish into fish soup hell in response--as did the West in Vietnam in that war--every tree, every outhouse, every shack, and every village, until they drop so much ordinance that the entire region is brain dead from defoliants and pockmarks and natural calamities, while leaving the center untouched, would seem insane. Yet that was the policy in Vietnam of America. And then nothing happened! Nothing happened week after week, year after year except that America itself was being driven mad doing the same thing, and expecting it to come out different. That, as the President-elect said in 1993, was and is insanity. But what choice did they all have? The pro-war liberal American leadership that designed the war in Vietnam did not dare bomb Hanoi, the capitol of North Vietnam, for fear of triggering World War III with Red China and with Soviet Russia--both of whose client North Vietnam was. So they tied their own hands, figuring that by coming through the back door, fish in the sea style, piece by piece, nobody will notice in China and Russia; ergo no World War III. So they took a strategy that was insane, and made a virtue out of its necessity. They tied their own hand! And then they blamed the opposition for forcing them to fight with their hands tied behind their backs. On the other h
Release on 2010 | by Dia Anagnostou,Evangelia Psychogiopoulou
Author: Dia Anagnostou,Evangelia Psychogiopoulou
Category: Political Science
This volume examines the effects of Strasbourg Court jurisprudence for protecting the rights of marginalised individuals and minorities. It argues that its consequences vary depending upon the diverse social, legal and institutional context that shapes litigation and judicial approaches in each country.
This volume brings together essays and reviews of Herbert H. Rowen, professor emeritus of Rutgers University, foreign member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and one of the first important English-speaking historians of the Dutch Republic since John Lothrop Motley. Many of the essays, though published previously, have not been readily available, while several appear here for the first time.
Ewa Ziarek fully articulates a feminist aesthetics, focusing on the struggle for freedom in women's literary and political modernism and the devastating impact of racist violence and sexism. She examines the contradiction between women's transformative literary and political practices and the oppressive realities of racist violence and sexism, and she situates these tensions within the entrenched opposition between revolt and melancholia in studies of modernity and within the friction between material injuries and experimental aesthetic forms. Ziarek's political and aesthetic investigations concern the exclusion and destruction of women in politics and literary production and the transformation of this oppression into the inaugural possibilities of writing and action. Her study is one of the first to combine an in-depth engagement with philosophical aesthetics, especially the work of Theodor W. Adorno, with women's literary modernism, particularly the writing of Virginia Woolf and Nella Larsen, along with feminist theories on the politics of race and gender. By bringing seemingly apolitical, gender-neutral debates about modernism's experimental forms together with an analysis of violence and destroyed materialities, Ziarek challenges both the anti-aesthetic subordination of modern literature to its political uses and the appreciation of art's emancipatory potential at the expense of feminist and anti-racist political struggles.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms became an entrenched part of the Canadian Constitution on April 17, 1982. The Charter represented a significant change in Canadian constitutional order and carried the courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, decisively into some of the biggest controversies in Canadian politics. Although the impact of the Charter on Canadian law and society was profound, a new status quo has been established. Even though there will be future Charter surprises and decisions that will claim news headlines, Peter J. McCormick argues that these cases will be occasional rather than frequent, and that the Charter "revolution" is over. Or, as he puts it in his introduction, "I will tell a story about the Charter, about the big ripples that have gradually but steadily died away such that the surface of the pond is now almost smooth." The End of the Charter Revolution explores the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, beginning with a general historical background, followed by a survey of the significant changes brought about as Charter decisions were made. The book addresses a series of specific cases made before the Dickson, Lamer, and McLachlin Courts, and then provides empirical data to support the argument that the Charter revolution has ended. The Supreme Court has without question become "a national institution of the first order," but even though the Charter is a large part of why this has happened, it is not Charter decisions that will showcase the exercise of this power in the future.
Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era
Author: Thomas C. Field
Pubpsher: Cornell University Press
During the most idealistic years of John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress development program, Bolivia was the highest per capita recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Latin America. Nonetheless, Washington’s modernization programs in early 1960s Bolivia ended up on a collision course with important sectors of the country’s civil society, including radical workers, rebellious students, and a plethora of rightwing and leftwing political parties. In From Development to Dictatorship, Thomas C. Field Jr. reconstructs the untold story of USAID’s first years in Bolivia, including the country’s 1964 military coup d’état. Field draws heavily on local sources to demonstrate that Bolivia’s turn toward anticommunist, development-oriented dictatorship was the logical and practical culmination of the military-led modernization paradigm that provided the liberal underpinnings of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. In the process, the book explores several underappreciated aspects of Cold War liberal internationalism: the tendency of "development" to encourage authoritarian solutions to political unrest, the connection between modernization theories and the rise of Third World armed forces, and the intimacy between USAID and CIA covert operations. At the same time, the book challenges the conventional dichotomy between ideology and strategy in international politics, and it engages with a growing literature on development as a key rubric for understanding the interconnected processes of decolonization and the Cold War.